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1987] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
tion, the defendant could raise this jurisdictional objection after
the statute of limitations had run and thereby deprive the plaintiff
of an opportunity of bringing a timely action."8
By issuing such a strong statement to practitioners, the Ad-
desso court has furthered the purpose of CPLR 3211(e)'s mandate
-promoting judicial efficiency in the disposition of issues. Addi-
tionally, the decision diminishes the likelihood that defendants will
be able to cause unnecessary delays which could preclude plaintiffs
from bringing meritorious claims.
Leanne Sinclair Jacobs
CPLR 4317(b): Equitable distribution of marital assets is not a
proper subject for a compulsory reference
Article 43 of the CPLR enunciates the procedures governing a
trial conducted by a referee1 or a judicial hearing officer.2 These
" See generally Siegel, supra note 23, at S-24, col. 1. In his article, Professor Siegel
explains the interplay between defects in summons service, statutes of limitations, and
Markoff's interpretation of CPLR 205(a) and how these three factors can affect a plaintiff's
ability to pursue a cause of action. Id. The first factor is the dismissal of the action because
of defective service-as was the case in Addesso. Id. The second factor occurs when the
statute of limitations has already run at the time of such dismissal. Id. The third factor is
the decision in Markoff holding that CPLR 205(a)'s six month extension of the statute of
limitations does not apply when the action is dismissed due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
Id. When these three factors occur together, the plaintiff is precluded from proceeding with
the action. Id.
I CPLR art. 43 (McKinney 1963). The CPLR provides for three modes of trial practice:
trial by jury, trial by a judge, and trial by a referee. See SmGEL § 379, at 492. The authority
of the courts to appoint a referee is contained in CPLR section 4001. CPLR 4001 (McKin-
ney 1963). Only attorneys admitted to practice in New York may be designated as referees.
CPLR 4312(1) (McKinney 1963). The referee must conduct a "trial in the same manner as a
court trying an issue without a jury," CPLR 4318 (McKinney Supp. 1988), and the decision
of the referee is accorded the same authority as the decision of a court. CPLR 4319 (McKin-
ney 1963). See Lipton v. Lipton, 128 Misc. 2d 528, 534, 489 N.Y.S.2d 994, 999 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1985) (determination of referee or judicial hearing officer is as binding as
supreme court justices'); aff'd, 119 App. Div. 2d 809, 501 N.Y.S.2d 437 (2d Dep't 1986) Bux-
baum v. Buxbaum, 118 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 460 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y.
County 1983) (decision of referee accorded same treatment as decision of justice of coordi-
nate jurisdiction); 4 WK&M 1 4319.01, at 43-55 (1987) (referee's decision stands as a court
decision).
2 CPLR 4301 (McKinney Supp. 1987). A 1983 amendment to section 4301 provides
that, for the purposes of article 43, the term "referee" shall include a "judicial hearing of-
ficer." Ch. 840, § 4, [1983] N.Y. Laws 1601. A judicial hearing officer is defined as a former
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court-appointed assistants exercise broad powers ranging from the
performance of ministerial acts to the reporting on or determina-
tion of an issue.3 The CPLR explicitly allows the parties to an ac-
tion to stipulate to the determination of any issue by a referee.4 In
addition, section 4317(b) enables a court to order a "compulsory
reference, '" 5 without the consent of the parties, if the trial of an
judge who has retired or otherwise left the bench and is certified by the chief administrator
as mentally and physically able to perform judicial duties. See CPLR 105 (McKinney Supp.
1988).
The judicial hearing officer was created in an attempt to implement proposals contained
in the Report of the Committee to Utilize the Services of Retired Judges. See COMM TO
UTILIZE THE SERVICES OF RETIRED JUDGES REP., reprinted in Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf
of the Chief Administrative Judge, at app. 'D' 1, 29 Schanback v. Schanback, 130 App. Div.
2d 332, 519 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dep't 1987) [hereinafter CoMMrrr REPORT]. This Committee
had been created to propose an efficient mechanism for utilizing the services of retired
judges to relieve the court system of calendar congestion and delay. Id. at 1.
3 See CPLR 4001 (McKinney 1963). CPLR 4001 authorizes a referee "to determine an
issue, perform an act, or inquire and report in any case where this power was heretofore
exercised and as may be hereafter authorized by law." Id. The more specific powers and the
actual procedures for appointment are found in articles 42 and 43 of the CPLR. If a referee
performs a ministerial act, he possesses the same powers as the appointing court has in
performing that function. See CPLR 4301 (McKinney Supp. 1987). In addition, a referee
has the authority of the court when the reference involves the determination of an issue. Id.
However, a reference to inquire and report only authorizes a referee to function in an advi-
sory, rather than a determinative, capacity. See CPLR 4001, commentary at 59 (McKinney
1963). The final decision, utilizing the referee's report, is made by the appointing court. See
id.
A referee's powers are not unlimited. See CPLR 4301 (McKinney Supp. 1987). A refe-
ree "shall have no power to relieve himself of his duties, to appoint a successor or to adjudge
any person except a witness before him guilty of contempt." Id. Although a referee's author-
ity to enforce decisions through contempt powers is limited, a trial referee functions in the
same way as the court. See, e.g., Simmons v. Benn, 96 App. Div. 2d 507, 508, 464 N.Y.S.2d
811, 812 (2d Dep't 1983) (referee has power to raise issue of unclean hands sua sponte);
Kardanis v. Velis, 90 App. Div. 2d 727, 727, 455 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (1st Dep't 1982) (trial
referee decides matter of witness credibility). See also SIEGEL § 379, at 494 (referee has
same powers as court carrying out similar function).
4 CPLR 4317(a) (McKinney 1963). See, e.g., Sternberg v. Sternberg, 88 App. Div. 2d
950, 950, 451 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (2d Dep't 1982) (parties may consent to hearing by referee);
Werner v. Jocelyn-Varn Oil Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 648, 649, 291 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90 (1st Dep't
1968) (parties may consent to appointment of referee).
The statute mandates that a reference to determine certain issues requires court leave
even if the parties unanimously consent. CPLR 4317(a) (McKinney 1963). Approval of the
court is needed in a matrimonial action, an action against a corporation to obtain a dissolu-
tion or to receive or distribute its property, and an action involving an infant defendant. Id.
I See CPLR 4317(b) (McKinney 1963). Section 4317(b) provides that-
On motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may order a reference to
determine a cause of action or an issue where the trial will require the examina-
tion of a long account, including actions to foreclose mechanic's liens; or to deter-
mine an issue of damages separately triable and not requiring a trial by jury, or
where otherwise authorized by law.
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issue requires the "examination of a long account."' Recently, in
Schanback v. Schanback,7 the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, held that a compulsory reference to determine the economic
issues in a matrimonial action was inappropriate since such an ac-
tion does not require an "examination of a long account." 8
In Schanback, the plaintiff commenced an action against her
husband for a divorce on the ground of abandonment.9 The diverse
marital property, accumulated over thirty years, encompassed mu-
tual business enterprises, real estate holdings, investments and
personal property.10 This property was to be divided through equi-
table distribution, and counsel for both parties estimated that a
trial to determine the economic issues would last approximately
four weeks." Over the objections of both parties, the judge invoked
the "long account" compulsory reference authorization of section
4317(b) and referred these issues to a judicial hearing officer for a
determination.12 After presiding over a month-long trial, the judi-
cial hearing officer issued a written opinion which included a sum-
Id.
Compulsory reference has been utilized in a variety of actions. See, e.g., Belle v. Chron-
alloy Am. Corp., 51 App. Div. 2d 933, 933, 381 N.Y.S.2d 253, 253 (1st Dep't 1976) (defama-
tion action); Troster Singer & Co. v. Kessler, 50 App. Div. 2d 539, 539, 375 N.Y.S.2d 331,
332 (1st Dep't 1975) (personal jurisdiction issue).
CPLR 4317(b) (McKinney 1963); see also infra notes 12 & 26 (description of issues
involved in a long account). The "long account" case is the classic example of a compulsory
reference. See SIEGEL § 379, at 493-94.
There is no constitutional barrier to the compulsory reference of a cause of action in-
volving the examination of a long account because New York's first Constitution guaranteed
a jury trial only in cases in which they had been used before; pre-constitution practice had
allowed the compulsory reference of a long account. See Steck v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co.,
142 N.Y. 236, 238, 37 N.E. 1, 2 (1894); see also SIEGEL §379, at 493-94 (compulsory reference
of long account constitutional). Consequently, if a case involves a long account, the process
of fact finding can be taken away from the jury without the consent of the parties and can
be determined by an expert. See SIEGEL § 379, at 493-94.
7 130 App. Div. 2d 332, 519 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2d Dep't 1987).
8 Id. at 343, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
9 See id. at 334, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
10 See id. at 335, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 820. These items included a multi-million dollar busi-
ness enterprise, the marital residence, real estate interests in Florida, mortgages, limited
partnerships' interests, stock and bond portfolios, pension plans, tax shelters, jewelry and
furs. Id.
1 See id. at 334, 519 N.Y.S.2d 820. The judge recommended that, in view of the length
of time involved, the parties should agree to a reference of the economic issues. Id. Both
parties refused to consent. Id.
12 See id. The administrative judge stated that "an extended equitable distribution case
is the classic case to go to a judicial hearing officer. It involves complex financial issues,
listening to expert witnesses and multiple figures and is what the law envisions when the
statutes were amended to include a judicial hearing officer as a referee." Id.
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mary of the testimony and evidence presented, factual findings,
and conclusions of law.13 Moreover, the opinion stated that the
compulsory reference was proper and necessarily consistent with
the "long account" requirement of the statute. 4
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, holding
that "equitable distribution actions cannot be reasonably charac-
terized as 'examination[s] of a long account.' "15 Writing for a
unanimous panel, Justice Mollen noted the lack of statutory au-
thority for compulsory reference of equitable distribution issues."6
After examining the equitable distribution law,17 Justice Mollen
concluded that this statute compels the court to determine the
value of marital assets which requires consideration of various in-
tangible factors. 18 Conversely, an examination of a long account
was characterized by the court as traditionally limited to distinct
matters involving tangible mathematical calculations.'9 Conse-
quently, equitable distribution of marital property requires the
resolution of issues which are fundamentally different from those
13 See id.
14 See id. at 335-36, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 820-21. The judicial hearing officer stated that
"[the use of Judicial Hearing Officers in matrimonial actions envisions long and detailed
examination and cross-examination to determine valuations of both marital and separate
property. Compulsory reference is necessary and proper where ... the matter involves intri-
cate and complex details of financial dealings, resources and equities." Id. at 336, 519
N.Y.S.2d at 821.
" Id. at 343, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
"6 See id. The court deemed it significant that the legislature did not enact specific
legislation to empower judicial hearing officers to hear and determine issues in matrimonial
actions without the parties consent. See id. at 337-38, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 822. As additional
support, the court relied upon the repeal of Judiciary Law section 116, which had specifi-
cally provided for compulsory references in matrimonial actions. Id.
1 See DRL § 236(B) (McKinney 1986). For matrimonial actions commenced on or after
July 19, 1980, the concept of alimony has been replaced by equitable distribution provisions
which provide for "maintenance" and a "distributive award." See Ch. 281, § 9, [1980] N.Y.
Laws 448 (McKinney).
" See Schanback, 130 App. Div. 2d at 342, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 825. The court noted that
many provisions of the equitable distribution law require the exercise of a court's discretion
beyond the rubric of the examination of a long account. See, e.g., DRL § 236(B)(1)(c), (d)
(McKinney Supp. 1988) (deciding which assets are "marital" rather than "separate prop-
erty"); id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(2) (McKinney 1986) (determining distribution of marital assets
based on duration of marriage, age and health of both parties); id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1986) (ascertaining need of custodial parent to occupy the marital residence); id. §
236(B)(5)(d)(11) (McKinney 1986) (wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse); id. §
236(B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney 1986) (tax consequences of each party); id. § 236(B)(6) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1988) (intangible factors may be considered in fixing separate maintenance
needs).
" See Schanback, 130 App. Div. 2d at 343, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
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traditionally involved in the examination of a long account.2"
The Schanback court also rejected the Chief Administrative
Judge's position21 that the Governor's statements,22 and the Com-
mittee Report on the Utilization of Retired Judges23 supported the
use of compulsory reference for resolution of equitable distribution
issues.24 Justice Mollen reasoned that these declarations only ad-
dressed the current legislative scheme which permits the judicial
hearing officer to determine issues if the parties consent.25 It is
submitted that the Schanback court's failure to recognize the es-
sential character of the issues involved in the equitable distribu-
tion of property, coupled with a lateral definition of a long account,
caused the court to err in concluding that equitable distribution
does not involve the examination of a long account. Limiting the
scope of a long account to purely mathematical calculations is fun-
damentally flawed because it ignores precisely those kinds of issues
20 Id. The court addressed the characterization of a marriage as an "economic partner-
ship," see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 585, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
746 (1985), and found that the similarities between the "winding up" process in equitable
distribution and those involved in business relationships are more apparent than real. See
Schanback, 130 App. Div. 2d at 341, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 824. "Unlike an account for goods sold,
work performed or money advances, the distributive award to which a spouse is entitled...
cannot be determined by reference to a contractual or mathematical formula, but rather
requires ... the court's discretion." Id.
21 See Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf of the Chief Administrative Judge at 18,
Schanback v. Schanback, 130 App. Div. 2d 332, 519 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2d Dep't 1987).
2 See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 840, N.Y. Laws (Aug. 4, 1983), re-
printed in [1983] N.Y. Laws 2813 (McKinney). Governor Cuomo emphasized that, upon the
amendment of the Judiciary Law, former judges and justices of the Unified Court System
would be permitted to serve as judicial hearing officers "when such services are necessary to
expedite the business of the courts .... A judicial hearing officer will be empowered to serve
as a referee in civil matters, including matrimonial actions." See id.
22 See COMMIrrz REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. In recommending the creation of the
judicial officer position, the Committee noted that, "[b]urgeoning litigation and a chronic
shortage of judges make it counterproductive to take up a judge's time in protracted fact-
finding hearings. This is becoming even more compelling with the recent enactment of the
law for equitable distribution of marital assets... which requires long accountings of mari-
tal assets .... ." Id. The Committee concluded that the use of retired judges as state-paid
judicial hearing officers provides the system with an efficient tool to ease the overburdened
judicial system. See id. at 12.
2' See Schanback, 130 App. Div. 2d at 343-44, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
25 Id. Consensual reference to a judicial hearing officer to hear and determine is pro-
vided for in CPLR 4317(a). However, court leave is required for a reference in a matrimonial
action. See CPLR 4317(a). The Schanback court also noted that under "exceptional condi-
tions" a reference to hear and report, as distinguished from an adjudication of an issue,
could be done without the consent of the parties in a matrimonial action. See Schanback,
130 App. Div. 2d at 344, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 826. Non-consensual reference to hear and report
is authorized by CPLR 4212. See CPLR 4212 (McKinney 1963).
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which fall squarely within the broad, judicially-evolved definition
of complex and intricate long account issues.28 Just as a business
dissolution may compel a long account of various valuation and
ownership issues, so too may an equitable distribution of extensive
business and property holdings. As illustrated in Schanback, a
husband and wife often find themselves involved in business rela-
tionships.28 Consequently, it is suggested that a rule which allows a
compulsory reference for unmarried business parties yet proscribes
such reference when the business partners are married, manifests
an inconsistent application of the law.
The underlying policy behind the creation of the judicial of-
ficer, alleviation of crowded court dockets,29 has been severely im-
paired by the court's ruling in Schanback. It is submitted that,
through narrowing of the long account definition, the court
adopted a standard for compulsory reference which conflicts with
legislative policy. 0 The elimination of compulsory reference of eq-
uitable distribution issues will eviscerate the full breadth of CPLR
26 See, e.g., Brooklyn Public Library v. City of New York, 240 N.Y. 465, 468-69, 148
N.E. 637, 639 (1925) (long account issues subject to compulsory reference are "intricate or
uncertain or subject to conflicting inferences"); Cassidy v. McFarland, 139 N.Y. 201, 206, 34
N.E. 893, 896 (1893) (long account requires actual contest as to correctness of different
charges, conflicting proof and prolonged examination of witnesses for numerous litigated
items); Camp v. Ingersoll, 86 N.Y. 433, 435 (1881) (an account is a long account if it is
"made up of the dealings of the parties"); Glass v. Thompson, 51 App. Div. 2d 69, 76, 379
N.Y.S.2d 427, 434 (2d Dep't 1976) (purpose of compulsory reference of long account case is
to remove complicated and intricate issues from court and jury). Historically, long accounts
encompass issues that are so numerous and tedious that it would be impossible for a jury to
resolve them within the reasonable time frame of a trial. See Camp, 86 N.Y. at 436.
27 Cf. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 585, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
746 (characterization of a marriage as an "economic partnership"); DRL § 236, commentary
at 12 (McKinney Supp. 1988) ("marriage is . . . an economic partnership").
28 See Schanback, 130 App. Div. 2d at 335, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 820. See also supra note 10
and accompanying text (description of business and personal holdings).
29 See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-2.
30 See id. at 11. While the Schanback court addressed the Committee's purported pur-
pose of judicial hearing officers, see Schanback, 130 App. Div. 2d at 344, 519 N.Y.S.2d at
826, the court failed to discuss the precise statement by the Committee that "equitable
distribution . . . requires long accountings." See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11
(emphasis added). When the legislature amended the Judiciary Law in 1983, to accomplish
the goals of the Committee Report, it did so in light of the Committee's conclusion that
equitable distribution actions fall within the rubric of long accounts. See id.
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4317(b) and will hinder, rather than advance, the legislature's at-
tempt at calendar relief.
Robert Joseph Rando
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 270.35: Trial judges granted broad discretion to discharge
juror who fails to appear at the trial two hours after scheduled
time
Fundamental to our democratic system of jurisprudence is an
accused's right to a trial by jury,' as recognized by the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.2 Inher-
I See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding
body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence
that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care." Id. at 486. See generally L. MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF
LMERTY (1973) (tracing development of jury from ancient Greece to Henry 11 of England to
Revolutionary America); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3-20 (1966) (tradition
and scope of Anglo-American criminal jury). "The right to jury trial is immemorial; it was
brought from England to this country by colonists, and it has become a part of birthright of
every free man." 47 AM. JuR. 2D Jury § 12, at 635 (1969). The Magna Carta has often been
credited with guaranteeing trial by jury. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
"When Magna Charta [sic] declared that no freeman should be deprived of life, etc., 'but by
the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land,' it referred to a trial by twelve jurors."
Id. at 349.
The right to trial by jury has had many staunch supporters, including Thomas Jeffer-
son, who wrote: "Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in
the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the
Legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the making [of] them." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to the Abb6 Arnoux (July 19, 1789), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THoMAs JEFFERSON 282, 283 (J. Boyd ed. 1958). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
157-58 (1968) (grant of jury trial for serious offenses essential for preventing miscarriages of
justice and assuring fair trials). Despite overwhelming support, the jury trial concept has
had its critics as well. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled, Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Palko, Justice Cardozo wrote, "[tihe right to trial by
jury... [is] not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish [the jury] is
not to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.' "Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934)). See also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188 (Harlan J. dissenting) (criticizing jury system
as cumbersome); Lummus, Civil Juries and the Law's Delay, 12 B.U.L. REV. 487, 489 (1932)
(jury system contributes to delay).
2 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
.. " Id. The right to trial by jury applies to nearly all criminal cases whether at the federal
